Testing Randomness by Matching Pennies by Pavlovic, Dusko et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
3.
03
18
5v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
 Fe
b 2
01
8
Testing Randomness by Matching Pennies
Dusko Pavlovic Peter-Michael Seidel Muzamil Yahia
University of Hawaii, Honolulu, USA
{dusko,pseidel,muzamil}@hawaii.edu
Abstract
In the game of Matching Pennies, Alice and Bob each hold a penny,
and at every tick of the clock they simultaneously display the head or the
tail sides of their coins. If they both display the same side, then Alice
wins Bob’s penny; if they display different sides, then Bob wins Alice’s
penny. To avoid giving the opponent a chance to win, both players seem
to have nothing else to do but to randomly play heads and tails with equal
frequencies. However, while not losing in this game is easy, not missing
an opportunity to win is not. Randomizing your own moves can be made
easy. Recognizing when the opponent’s moves are not random can be
arbitrarily hard.
The notion of randomness is central in game theory, but it is usually
taken for granted. The notion of outsmarting is not central in game theory,
but it is central in the practice of gaming. We pursue the idea that these
two notions can be usefully viewed as two sides of the same coin. The
resulting analysis suggests that the methods for strategizing in gaming and
security, and for randomizing in computation, can be leveraged against
each other.
1 Introduction
1.1 Game of Matching Pennies
The payoff matrix for Matching Pennies is displayed on Table 1. For the con-
venience of using the bitstring notations, we denote the heads move as 0 and
the tails move as 1. The game is repeated, and we assume that it is played long
enough that even the smallest strategic advantages are captured in the outcome.
Both players can win or lose arbitrarily large amounts of pennies.
1.2 How not to lose Matching Pennies
To determine her strategy, Alice might reason something like this.
Suppose that I consistently play 1 with a frequency p ∈ [0, 1] and
thus 0 with a frequency 1 − p. If I set p < 12 , then Bob can get the
expected payoff −p + (1 − p) = 1 − 2p > 0 by playing 1. If I set
p > 12 , then Bob can get the expected payoff p− (1−p) = 2p−1 > 0
1
0 1
−1 1
0 1 −1
1 −1
1 −1 1
Table 1: Payoffs for Matching Pennies
by playing 0. If I set p = 12 , then Bob’s expected payoff is the same
whether he plays 1 or 0: it is 1 − 2p = 2p − 1 = 0. Since Bob’s
winnings are my losses, the best strategy for me is to set p = 12 ,
and to play 0 and 1 with equal frequencies, since that minimizes my
expected losses.
By the same reasoning, Bob arrives at the same conclusion, that he should set
the frequency of playing 1 at q = 12 . This is the well known Nash equilibrium
of the game of Matching Pennies. Both players arrive to it by minimizing the
expected losses.
1.3 Playing Matching Pennies
In general, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium prescribes the frequencies for both
players’ moves in the long run. The essential assumption is that the moves will
be randomized. If Bob’s move is predictable with some likelihood, then Alice
can increase her chances to win. It seems natural to imagine that the players
randomize by tossing their coins, and displaying the random outcomes. At the
equilibrium, the players are just passive servants of chance, since they cannot
gain anything by deviating from it. If they are rational, all they can do is toss
their coins.
But suppose that Bob suddenly plays
0101010101010101010101010101010101010101 (1)
Will Alice predict that Bob’s next move is 0 and play 0 to win a penny? If she
thinks probabilistically, she will probably notice that the probability of getting
(1) by flipping a fair coin is 2−40, which is exactly the same as the chance of
getting, e.g.
1101000100110101001011100100000100000010 (2)
or any other sequence that she would accept as random. If Alice’s rationality is
based on probabilities, then she will not be able to distinguish any two strings
of Bob’s moves, since they are all equally probable if he tosses fair coins.
But if Bob knows, or even just believes, that Alice’s rationality is based on
probabilities, and that Alice will thus continue to randomize her moves in any
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case, then Bob has no reason to randomize, since playing (1), or (2), or a string
of 0s, or any other string, yield the same expected payoff against Alice’s random
plays. On the other hand, if Alice believes that Bob’s rationality is based on
probabilities, then she will have no reason to randomize either, for the same
reason as Bob.
So by combining their beliefs about their probabilistic reasoning, both play-
ers will become indifferent towards mixing and randomizing their moves. Their
common knowledge that they may both stop randomizing, because they both
know that the opponent will be unable to tell, will not change their expected
payoffs. Indeed, if they both play non-randomly, one of them will almost surely
win and the other will lose, but their chances to be the winner are the same,
and they average out. However, while the expected payoffs remain unchanged,
the higher moments will, of course, change significantly.
1.4 How to win Matching Pennies if you can
In order to exploit Bob’s deviation from the equilibrium, or to give him an
incentive to genuinely randomize his mixed equilibrium strategy, Alice must go
beyond probabilities, i.e. beyond just calculating the frequency of his moves. If
she just checks whether the frequencies of 0 and 1 are 12 , she will detect that
the string consisting of 0s alone is not random, but not that the string (1) is
not random; if she checks whether the frequencies of 00, 01, 10 and 11 are 14 ,
she will detect that (1) is not random, but not that the string where these four
digraphs of bits alternate is not random; etc. By checking that each bitstring of
length n has in the long run the frequency 12n , she will detect many non-random
plays, but still miss most of them. E.g., the string
011011100101110111100010011010101111001101 . . . (3)
obtained by concatenating the binary notations for the sequence of natural
numbers 0,1,2,3. . . will pass the bias tests for all n-grams, if taken long enough,
yet it is, of course, easily predictable, and obviously not random. Moreover,
Bob might, e.g., randomize all even bits, and just alternate 0s and 1s at the
odd positions. To recognize such opportunities, Alice will have to check that
every substring of the string of Bob’s past moves has unbiased frequencies of all
n-grams. As the game goes on, Alice will thus have to keep proving that Bob’s
play, i.e. the ever growing string of his past moves, is what von Mises called
Kollektiv in his theory of probability [20]. Proving that something is a Kollektiv
is known to be a problematic task, as specifying the substrings to be tested has
led to problems that remained open for many years [33, 2].
1.5 Randomness from equilibrium
Scratching the surface of the basic assumption about the players’ incentive to
implement a mixed strategy equilibrium led us straight into the foundations
of probability. There is, of course, nothing surprising about the fact that the
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concept of a mixed strategy, expressed in terms of probability, depends on the
foundations of probability. The point is not so much that there are deep foun-
dational problems lurking behind simple games. It seems much more useful,
and more interesting, that, the other way around, there seem to be instructive
ways to state the solutions of the foundational problems of probability in terms
of games.
In particular, we show that the usual definition of mixed strategy equilibria
based on the notion of randomness as given can be reversed, and that the notion
of randomness can be defined using mixed strategy equilibria. The upshot is
not just that a complicated concept of randomness is replaced by an intuitive
game theoretic concept of not losing Matching Pennies at the equilibrium; the
upshot is also that the effective content of both concepts, of randomness and
of equilibrium, can be analyzed in terms of computational power of testing.
This formalization brings both the basic probabilistic concepts and the basic
game theoretic concepts into the logical realm of computable inductive inference
[7, 31, 3, 28, 36].
1.6 Background and related work
We propose a simple and narrow bridge between games and probabilities. An
extensive effort towards reconstructing the foundations of probability theory
from a particular game has been ongoing for many years, as reported by Shafer
and Vovk [30]. The work presented in this paper is not only at the opposite end
of the scale in terms of its scope and technical sophistication, but it also goes
in a different direction, and therefore uses an essentially different model. While
the authors of [30] aim to reconstitute the full power of the diverse probabilistic
tools in their rich gaming model, the point here is to illustrate how the most
basic games capture the most basic probability concepts in a natural fashion.
A similar analysis geared in the opposite direction of eliminating probabilities
is provided in [35].
The bridge between games and probabilities is built using significance testing
and computation. Significance testing goes back to Fisher [7, 7] and lies, of
course, at the core of the method of statistical induction. The constructions
sketched here are related to the computational versions of testing, developed on
one hand in Martin-Lo¨f’s work [19, 22], and on the other hand in the techniques
of inductive learning [8, 3, 34].
We analyze the computational content of testing. The analyses of the com-
putational content of strategic reasoning go back to the earliest days of game
theory [27], and continue through theory of bounded rationality [29], and on a
broad front of algorithmic game theory [23]. The finite state machine model
seems preferred for specifying strategies [29, 11], since computable strategies
lead to problems with the equilibrium constructions [15, 21]. In recent work,
a different family of problems, arising from the cost of strategic computations
has been analyzed, including the cost of randomization [9, 10]. This led the
players to not just lose the incentive to randomize, as in the little story above,
but to prefer determinism. Although we are here also looking at the problem
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of deviating from the equilibrium into non-randomness, we are concerned with
a completely different question: How should the opponent recognize and exploit
this deviation? The present work seems to deviate from previous computational
approaches to gaming in one essential aspect: we are not analyzing the compu-
tations that the players perform to construct or implement their own strategies,
or the equilibrium, but the computations that they perform to test the oppo-
nents’ strategies. This leads into a completely different realm of computability,
that emerges from a different aspect of gaming. While the analysis goes through
for most models of computation, represented by an abstract family of program-
mable functions, as explained in Sec 2.3, it is perhaps worth stating the obvious:
that stronger notions of computation lead to stronger notions of randomness.
Although the recently introduced high level models of gaming [1, 24, 12] are
not explicitly introduced in the paper, as they are not necessary for the presented
results, they were used in the original versions of the presented results, and can
perhaps be recognized in the background.
1.7 Outline of the paper
In Sec. 2 we spell out the preliminaries and some notations used in the paper. In
Sec. 3 we motivate and explain the simplest case of randomness testing, with re-
spect to the uniform distributions, and describe its application in gaming. Sec. 4
derives as a corrolary the characterization of random strings as the equilibrium
plays. In Sec. 5 we describe how to construct randomness tests for arbitrary
programmable distributions. Sec. 6 closes the paper with some final comments.
2 Notations and preliminaries
2.1 Monoid of plays
In the games considered in this paper, the set of moves is always 2 = {0, 1}. We
sometimes call 0 heads and 1 tails. A play is a finite string (or list, or vector)
of moves ~x = x1x2x3 · · ·xm, or ~y = y1y2y3 · · · yn played in a match of a game.
The set of all bitstrings, used to represent plays, is denoted by 2∗. The empty
bitstring is (), and the concatenation of bitstrings is ~x :: ~y = x1 · · ·xmy1 · · · yn.
They constitute the monoid
(
2
∗, ::, ()
)
, freely generated by 2. The monoid
structure induces the prefix ordering
~x ⊑ ~y ⇐⇒ ∃~z. ~x :: ~z = ~y (4)
and the length measure ℓ : 2∗ −→ N, which is the unique homomorphism from
the free monoid over two generators to the free monoid over one generator. The
fact that the length measure is a homomorphism means that
ℓ() = 0 and ℓ (~x :: ~y) = ℓ (~x) + ℓ (~y)
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We shall also need a bijective pairing 〈−,−〉 : 2∗×2∗ −→ 2∗ with the projections
−(0),−(1) : 2
∗ −→ 2∗, which means that together they satisfy〈
~x(0), ~x(1)
〉
= ~x 〈~x0, ~x1〉(i) = ~xi
Using the fact that a free monoid is also cofree, a bijective pairing can be derived
from any two disjoint injections 2∗ →֒ 2∗. For simplicity, we use
〈~x, ~y〉 = x1x1x2x2 · · ·xmxm01y1y2 · · · yn (5)
where ~x = x1x2 · · ·xm and ~y = y1y2 · · · yn. The length induces the shift homo-
morphism
ℓ (〈~x, ~y〉) = 2ℓ(~x) + ℓ(~y) + 2 (6)
2.2 Sets and functions
|X | denotes the number of elements of the set X . A function written f : X → Y
is always total, whereas a partial function is written h : X ⇁ Y . We write h(x)↓
when the partial function h is defined on the input x, and h(x)↑ or h(x) =↑
when h is undefined on x.
2.3 Programmable functions
We say that f : 2∗ ⇁ 2∗ is L-programmable, or that it is an L-function when it
is specified using a programming language L. The intuitions from the reader’s
favorite programming language, practical or theoretical, should do. For a theo-
retical example, one could take L to be the language of finite state machines. A
program could then be either a list of transitions of a Moore or Mealy machine,
or a corresponding regular expression [13, 4]. The graphs of programmable func-
tions would be regular as languages. A larger family or programmable functions
would be obtained from a Turing complete programming language, like Python
or Java, or from the language of Turing machines themselves. In the latter case,
a program could again be a list of the transitions of the machine. A high-level
formalism is based on the structure ofmonoidal computer, spelled out in [25, 26].
Formally, the programming language is given by a universal evaluator (or
interpreter), a partial function L : 2∗ × 2∗ ⇁ 2∗. This function may or may
not be in L. E.g., when L is a Turing complete language, then then L is an
L-function. If L is the language of regular expressions, then their universal
evaluator is not L-programmable.
We usually write L(x, y) in the form {x}y. A universal evaluator is char-
acterized by the requirement that for every L-function f : 2∗ −→ 2∗ there is a
bitstring pf :∈ 2
∗ such that
f(~x) = {pf}~x
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3 Randomness for uniform distributions
We focus on Alice’s task to detect patterns of non-randomness in Bob’s play,
which she could exploit to predict his moves. Bob is assumed to be doing the
same, observing Alice’s play and trying to detect some patterns. But what is a
pattern? And what does it mean to detect it?
Intuitively, an object has a pattern if it can be described succinctly, i.e.
compressed. E.g. the string in (1) can be compressed to (01)20 in mathematical
notation, or to
f o r ( i =0; i <20; i++) { pr i n t 01 }
in a Java-like programming language. The program to extend (1) infinitely
would be (01)∗ or
f o r ( ; ; ) { pr i n t 01 }
and the program to output (3) would be
f o r ( i =0; ; i++) { pr i n t i }
On the other hand, a program to output the string (2), without a detectable
pattern, would have to spell it out in full length:
pr i n t 110100010011010100101110010000010000001001
The idea that randomness can be defined as incompressibility goes back
to Kolmogorov [16], and further back to the scholastic logical principle known
as Occam’s Razor, which established the priority of succinct descriptions as
inductive hypotheses, as explained by Solomonoff [31].
3.1 Testing hypotheses
Definition 3.1. Let L be a family of programmable (partial) functions. A
hypothesis is an L-function h : 2∗ ⇁ 2∗ such that
h(~x) = ~y =⇒ ℓ(~x) < ℓ(~y) (7)
A string ~y that lies in the image of h is said to be h-regular. A string ~x on
which h is defined and maps it to ~y is a short description of ~y. A hypothesis h
is predictive if
∀~x. h(~x)↓ =⇒ ∃~z. ~x ⊏ ~z ∧ h(~x) ⊏ h(~z) (8)
where ⊏ is the prefix ordering (4).
The tacit idea behind predictive hypotheses is that the input data are given
with some end markings, which tell the computer where the input string ends.
This is the case with the data input on most real computers, but not on ”plain”
Turing machines, which leads to the restriction to prefix-free or self-delimiting
machines [39, 18, 5]. For the Turing machine model, the reader should assume
that there is a special symbol  denoting the end of each string, and that the
string inclusion ignores that symbol. The computation h (~x) thus halts when
it encounters  after ~x, whereas the computation h (~z) proceeds longer and
provides a longer output when h is predictive.
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Definition 3.2. A bitstring ~y is said to be h-regular at the level m ∈ N if
∃~x. h(~x) = ~y ∧ ℓ(~x) +m ≤ ℓ(~y) (9)
The h-regular bitstrings at each level form the h-regularity sets
Hnm = {~y ∈ 2
n|∃~x. h(~x) = ~y ∧ ℓ(~x) +m ≤ ℓ(~y)} (10)
Hm =
∞⋃
n=1
Hnm (11)
Setting for convenience H0 = 2
∗ yields a decreasing sequence of sets:
H0 ⊇ H1 ⊇ H2 ⊇ H3 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Hm ⊇ · · · (12)
This tower of sets is the h-test.
Note that a bitstring of length n can only be regular at the level m if m ≤ n.
The h-regularity sets Hnm for m > n are empty.
Proposition 3.3. The size of h-regularity sets decreases exponentially with m,
in the sense
|Hnm| < 2
1+n−m (13)
Proof. By (10), for every ~y ∈ Hnm there is ~x such that h(~x) = ~y and ℓ(~x) +m ≤
ℓ(~y), and thus ℓ(~x) ≤ n − m, because ~y ∈ 2n. The function h : 2∗ −→ 2∗ is
thus restricted to a surjection onto Hnm from the set of strings ~x of lengths at
most n−m. Hence (13). 
Proposition 3.3 says that the chance that an observation ~y is h-regular at the
level m decreases exponentially in m. Since this is true for all hypotheses, the
implication is that most bitstrings are irregular: most hypotheses are eventually
rejected, and most bitstrings are accepted as random. This is a formal expression
of Laplace’s observation that regular objects constitute a null set [17].
Definition 3.4. The h-regularity degree σh(~y) is the highest h-regularity level
that the bitstring ~y achieves, i.e.
σh(~y) = max{m ≤ ℓ(~y) | ~y ∈ Hm}
The h-regularity degree is thus a function σh : 2
∗ −→ N.
3.2 Alice’s testing strategy
Alice’s computations of h-regularity degree follow the basic method of signifi-
cance testing [6, 7]. She tests whether Bob’s play ~y satisfies the hypothesis h.
The hypothesis is rejected if ~y is not h-regular at a sufficiently high level. So
Alice goes down the test tower H0 ⊇ H1 ⊇ H2 ⊇ · · · , and checks how far is it
true that ~y ∈ Hm. This ceases to be true when m = σh(~y). The hypothesis h is
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thus rejected if the regularity degree σh(~y) is below some significance threshold
M , chosen in advance. If she wants to echo statisticians’ habit to set the signif-
icance level at 1% or 5%, Alice should probably choose M to be between 4 and
7, since the indices of the test towers correspond to the negative logarithms of
statistical significance levels.
But what is Alice trying to achieve by testing Bob? What will she do if
she detects a significant h-regularity in his play ~y? She wants to predict his
moves, and use the prediction to take his pennies. In particular, if she finds
a significantly shorter description ~x of ~y realized by h, she will try to guess a
bitstring ~s such that h (~x :: ~s) is defined, and extends ~y, i.e. such that
~y ⊏ h (~x :: ~s)
The definition of predictive hypotheses requires that they always allow such
extensions. So if she formulates a predictive hypothesis h, finds a short descrip-
tion ~x of Bob’s play ~y, and guesses an extension ~s allowing her to predict Bob’s
moves, Alice will match and take Bob’s pennies.
3.3 Separating regularity and randomness
The essence of Alice’s testing strategy is to separate a regular component of
Bob’s strategy from the random component. If Bob plays completely randomly,
his play ~y will not have a short description, and Alice will not find a hypothesis
h that ~y will satisfy. The regular component is then empty. If Alice finds a
hypothesis h and a short description ~x of ~y proving that ~y satisfies h, then h
captures some of the regularity of ~y. If there is still some regularity in ~x, then
it has a still shorter description ~x′, realized using a hypothesis h′. In other
words, ~x = h′ (~x′) and there is m′ such that ℓ (~x′) +m′ < ℓ (~x). But this means
that ~x′ is a still shorter description of Bob’s play ~y, showing that it satisfies
the hypothesis h ◦ h′ at the regularity level m + m′, since h ◦ h′ (~x′) = ~y and
ℓ (~x′) +m+m′ < ℓ (~y).
On the other hand, if ~x is incompressible, then it is random. In that case,
the short description ~x is the random component of Bob’s play ~y, whereas all of
its regularity is captured by h. Alice can thus extrapoloate Bob’s future moves
by running h. She also has to expand the random part ~x by some additional
randomness ~s, as presumably Bob will continue doing. In that sense, Alice still
has to gamble. But just like ~x is much shorter than h (~x) = ~y, the chance of
guessing ~x :: ~s is greater than the chance of guessing h (~x :: ~s). So separating out
the regular component h of Bob’s play and reducing the randomness of Bob’s
play to a significantly shorter description presents a significant advantage for
Alice.
Since σh (h (~x)) ≥ ℓ (~x), regularity increases with length, and the testing
outcomes become more significant, and provide better fitting predictions. On
the other hand, longer strings also fit more hypotheses, and the usual problems
of overfitting in statistical inference enter scene. But testing hypotheses as L-
programmable functions turns out to have a special feature, which we consider
next.
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3.4 Universal hypothesis
The main remaining question is: How should Alice choose her hypotheses? She
can, of course, stares at ~y and search for a pattern. She can try a hypothesis
h(1), and if it gets rejected, she can try h(2), and h(3), and so on. But which one
should she try first? Occam suggests: The simplest hypotheses should be tried
first. But which ones are the simplest? Solomonoff and Kolmogorov suggest:
The simplest functions are those that have the shortest programs [18, 28, 36].
This is where Alice comes to use the fact that her hypotheses are program-
mable. By enumerating all programs, she can in principle test all hypotheses.
If the universal evaluator L is L-programmable itself, she can in fact test a
universal hypothesis. The idea of a universal randomness test goes back to Per
Martin-Lo¨f [19]. Since it will eventually detect any regularity, any universal
hypothesis test is in fact also a universal randomness test, as random strings
can be characterized as just those that pass all tests [20].
Definition 3.5. A hypothesis υ : 2∗ ⇁ 2∗ is universal if any string that is
regular with respect to any hypothesis h is also regular with respect to υ. More
precisely, for every hypothesis h : 2∗ ⇁ 2∗ there is a constant ch such that for
every bitstring ~x holds
σh(~y) ≤ ch + συ(~y) (14)
Proposition 3.6. If the universal evaluator of a family of L-programmable
functions is L-programmable itself, then the family also contains a universal
hypothesis.
The assumption that the universal evaluator L is L-programmable is satisfied
not just when L interprets a Turing complete language, but also when it is
resticted to a complexity class with complete instances.
Proof. Let {} : 2∗ × 2∗ ⇁ 2∗ be a universal evaluator. Recall that this means
that for every computable function f : 2∗ ⇁ 2∗ there is a program ~pf such that
f(~x) = {~pf}~x. Define
υ(~x) =
{
{~x(0)}~x(1) if ℓ(~x) < ℓ
(
{~x(0)}~x(1)
)
↑ otherwise
(15)
Then υ : 2∗ ⇁ 2∗ is a hypothesis by Def. 3.1. For any hypothesis h : 2∗ ⇁ 2∗
and any bitstring ~x then holds
h(~x) = υ (〈~ph, ~x〉)
where ~ph is a program encoding h. Then for ch = 2ℓ (~ph) + 2 holds
ch + ℓ(~x) +m ≤ ℓ (υ (〈~ph, ~x〉)) = ℓ (h(~x)) (16)
were the constants 2 come from the particular definition of pairing and length
that we have chosen in (5) and (6). But (16) means that υ-regularity at the level
m implies h-regularity at the level m+ ch, i.e. U
n
m ⊆ H
n
m+ch
. Hence (14). 
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3.5 Alice’s universal strategy
If Bob’s play ~y is not random, then finding an ~x such that υ (~x) = ~y will separate
the regular component ~x(0) and the random component ~x(1) from his play ~y, as
explained in Sec. 3.3. Guessing Bob’s moves ~b can then be reduced to the task
of guessing a shorter random string ~s such that ~y :: ~b = υ (~x :: ~s).
In summary, Alice’s tasks are similar to her testing strategy: the first task
is to search for inverse images along a programmable function, this time υ :
2
∗ −→ 2∗; and her second task is again to use the detected regularity of ~y to
predict an extension.
Concerning the first task, note that Alice will stall if she simply lists a se-
quence of candidates ~x(1), ~x(2), ~x(3), . . . and tries to compute υ
(
~x(i)
)
=
{
~x
(i)
(0)
}
~x
(i)
(1)
for i = 1, 2, 3, . . ., one after another seeking to find an inverse image of ~y along υ.
That strategy will only go as far as the first ~x(i) for which the program ~x
(i)
0 di-
verges on the input ~x
(i)
1 ; the next candidate will never be tested. To avoid that,
the search for short descriptions ~x must proceed by dovetailing, as described
e.g. in [39]. This means that the search through the sequence ~x(1), ~x(2), ~x(3), . . .
should run a finite number of steps of each computation in a finite initial seg-
ment of the sequence, and keep extending that initial segment. In that way,
each member of the sequence will eventually be reached and run. E.g., a single
step of each of the computations υ
(
~x(i)
)
can be run in following order:
~x(1), ~x(2), ~x(1), ~x(2), ~x(3), ~x(1), ~x(2), ~x(3), ~x(4), ~x(1), . . .
Once Bob’s play ~y has been captured by a short description ~x, i.e. decom-
posed in the form ~y = {~x(0)}~x(1), where ~x(0) is the regular component of ~y, and
~x(1) is its random component, then Alice can proceed with the second task.
In summary, Alice’s universal strategy can be described as the search for the
earliest bitstring ~b which results from a shorest extension ~s of a shortest inverse
image ~x of ~y along υ. This can be summarized as the function α : 2∗ ⇁ 2∗
where
α(~y) = µ~b. A
(
~y,~b
)
where
A
(
~y,~b
)
⇐⇒ ∃~x~s. A˜
(
~x, ~y, ~s,~b
)
∧
∀~x′~s′.
(
A˜
(
~x′, ~y, ~s′,~b
)
⇒
ℓ (~x) ≤ ℓ (~x′) ∧ ℓ (~s) ≤ ℓ (~s′)
)
where
A˜
(
~x, ~y, ~s,~b
)
⇐⇒ υ (~x) = ~y ∧ {~x(0)}
(
~x(1) :: ~s
)
= ~y :: ~b
While Alice thus seeks to predict Bob’s moves ~b in order to play the same
moves, Bob’s universal strategy would be dual, in the sense that he would seek
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to predict Alice’s moves ~a in order to play the opposite moves. We discuss below
what happens if two universal strategies are played against each other.
4 Matching Pennies randomness
The notion of randomness as incompressibility, as formalized by Kolmogorov
[16] and developed in algorithmic information theory [18], has been justified
by Martin-Lo¨f’s proof that incompressible strings are just those that pass all
randomness tests [19, 22, 18]. But we have seen that randomness tests are also
a part of playing Matching Pennies. The players stay at the equilibrium only as
long as their plays pass each other’s tests. Whenever a test produces a significant
outcome, the randomness hypothesis is rejected, and the players depart from the
equilibrium, whether the detected pattern was a real consequence of someone’s
earlier deviation from the equilibrium, or whether the test overfitted a pattern
onto an actually random string. The equilibrium persists only if both players’
plays pass both players’ tests.
Corollary 4.1. A bitstring is uniformly random (in the sense of Kolmogorov
[16, 19]) if and only if it can occur as a play of the equilibrium strategy in the
game of Matching Pennies.
Proof idea. If a bitstring is uniformly random, then it will pass every ran-
domness test, and can occur as an equilibrium strategy. If a bitstring can occur
in an equilibrium strategy, and thus passes every randomness test, then it is
uniformly random. 
The upshot of this corollary is that randomness tests are an important aspect
of the actual process of gaming, yet they are generally abstracted away from
game theory. When randomness is taken for granted, the computational content
of equilibrium constructions are abstracted away from game theoretic analyses,
while the competitive aspects of gaming, of course, essentially depend on using
randomness, and recognizing non-randomness. Taking the randomness testing
for granted hides from sight the whole wide area of players’ strategic analyses
of each other’s plays, which is where the essence of real gaming is played out.
If Alice’s play passes Bob’s tests, but Alice’s tests detect the regularity behind
Bob’s play, then Alice will win by outsmarting Bob. Randomness and outsmart-
ing are two sides of the same coin. Taking one for granted hides the other one
from sight, and separates game theory from practice.
While the concept of randomness in the above statements largely follows
the approach and the ideas of Martin-Lo¨f [19, 5, 22, 18], the abstract view
of computation [25, 26], although lurking in the background in this extended
abstract, allows a broader approach. When L is a Turing complete language, and
testing is computable, then Prop. 3.6 implies that there is a universal strategy,
and Prop. 4.1 thus says that a bitstring is uniformly random if it does not lose
the game of Matching Pennies against the universal strategy. Using weaker
programming languages L, and thus specifying weaker randomness tests, yields
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weaker notions of randomness. A path towards a taxonomy of different notions
of randomness obtained in this way is discussed in [22]. The point here is that
all such notions can be cast in terms of games. A different approach to a similar
idea has been pursued to a much greater depth in [30].
5 Randomness for general distributions
Equilibrium strategies for the game of Matching Pennies are mixed uniformly,
in the sense that each move is assigned equal probability. Other games require
other mixtures, with different probabilities assigned to different moves. It is
easy to show that, any probability distribution over a finite set can arise as a
mixed strategy equilibrium for a game with suitable payoffs. Moreover, iterated
games, and games with dynamically changing payoffs, induce in the same way
the various forms of probability distributions over sets of strings of fixed lengths.
To study dynamics, and some particular stochastic processes that arise in com-
putation and cryptography, such probability distributions are often bundled
together into a particular kind of measures, which we call string distributions.
They also arise in a general form of mixed strategies for iterated games, and
for games with dynamically changing payoffs. And while such mixed strategies
require randomizing according to string distributions, their randomness can in
turn be defined in terms of mixed strategy equilibria again.
5.1 Testing P -hypotheses and P -randomness
Definition 5.1. A string distribution is an L-programmable1 function P :
2
∗ −→ [0, 1] such that
P () = 1 P (~x) = P (~x :: 0) + P (~x :: 1)
Definition 5.2. Given a string distribution P : 2∗ −→ [0, 1], a P -hypothesis
with respect to L is an L-function hP : 2
∗ ⇁ 2∗ such that
hP (~x) = ~y =⇒ ℓ(~x) < ℓ(~y) ∧ P (~x) > P (~y) (17)
A bitstring ~y is said to be hp-regular at the level m ∈ N whenever
∃~x. hP (~x) = ~y ∧ ℓ(~x) + m ≤ ℓ(~y) ∧ P (~x) ≥ 2
m · P (~y) (18)
The hP -regular bitstrings at each level form the hP -regularity sets
Hnm =
{
~y ∈ 2n | ∃~x. hP (~x) = ~y ∧
∧ ℓ(~x) +m ≤ ℓ(~y) ∧ P (~x) ≥ 2m · P (~y)
}
(19)
The sets Hm =
⋃
∞
n=1H
n
m form the hp-test
H1 ⊇ H2 ⊇ H3 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Hm ⊇ · · ·
1The programmability of a real function P can be defined in different ways. The idea going
back to Turing [32] is to present P as a program ~pP : 2
∗ −→ 2∗ which for each ~x outputs a
program ~pP (~x) which streams the digits of the real number P (~x) ∈ [0, 1].
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Proposition 5.3. The P -size of hP -regularity sets decreases exponentially with
m ∑
~y∈Hn
m
P (~y) < 21−m (20)
Proof. By definition of Hnm, for every ~y ∈ H
n
m there is ~x of length at most n−m
such that P (~y) ≤ 2−mP (~x). It follows that∑
~y∈Hn
m
P (~y) ≤
∑
~x∈2n−m
2−m · P (~x) < 21−m

The search for non-random patterns, deviating from a given string distribu-
tion P , proceeds just like the search for patterns deviating from the uniform
distribution in Sec. 3.2. When L is the family of all computable functions, there
is a universal P -hypothesis, defined just like in Def. 3.5.
Proposition 5.4. If the universal evaluator L and the string distribution P
are L-programmable, then there is an L-programmable universal P -hypothesis
as well.
Proof . The universal P -hypothesis is this time
υP (~x) =

{~x(0)}~x(1) if ℓ(~x) < ℓ
(
{~x(0)}~x(1)
)
and P (~x) > 22ℓ(~x(0))+2 · P
(
{~x(0)}~x(1)
)
↑ otherwise
(21)
were the 2s come again from (5) and (6). Setting ch = 2ℓ (~ph) + 2 again where
~ph is a program for hP we have
ch +m+ ℓ(~x) ≤ ℓ (υP (〈~ph, ~x〉)) = ℓ (hP (~x))
P (~x) > 2m · P (υ (〈~ph, ~x〉)) ≥ 2
ch+m · P (hP (~x))
which gives Unm ⊆ H
n
ch+m
. By Def. 3.5, this means that υP is universal for all
P -hypotheses hP . 
Corollary 5.5. A bitstring is P -random if and only if it can occur as a play
in a game where the string distribution P is a component of a mixed strategy
equilibrium.
5.2 Universal strategies beyond Matching Pennies
Just like a universal hypothesis can be used to build a universal strategy for win-
ning, if possible, in the game of Matching Pennies, universal P -hypotheses can
be used to build universal strategies for a large family of games, where mixed
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strategies are expressed in terms of string distributions. A familiar example
of such a game is the iterated version of Prisoners’ Dilemma, where dynami-
cally changing mixed strategies, inducing string distributions, have been played
in tournaments against each other since the early days. Strategies played in
such tournaments are usually described by finite state machines, and thus in-
duce L-programmable distributions where L is a language generating regular
expressions. More powerful languages allow specifying not only more powerful
strategies, but also games where the payoff matrices are not necessarily fixed
through the iterations of the game, but may also change, in an L-programmable
way. The crucial feature that allows analyzing such games are the fixed point
constructions, enabled by the universal evaluators.
We assume that the payoffs are public information, and that both Alice and
Bob have both computed the equilibrium strategies, and know the distributions
PA and PB according to which Alice and Bob, respectively, must randomly mix
their moves. Alice’s first task is thus to program a function ηA : 2
∗ −→ 2∗ to
search for short descriptions ~x = ηA (~y) of Bob’s plays ~y, whereas Bob’s first
task is to program a function ηB : 2
∗ −→ 2∗ to search for short descriptions
~u = ηB (~w) of Alice’s plays ~w. So they are both looking for a right inverse of
the universal P -detector of the opponent’s string distribution P , i.e.
υB ◦ ηA (~y) = ~y υA ◦ ηB (~w) = ~w
where we write υB to simplify υPB and υA for υPA . Their second tasks will
be to program functions ϑA, ϑB : 2
∗ −→ 2∗ to guess the likely extensions of
opponents’ plays, i.e.
υB ◦ ϑA ◦ ηA (~y) ⊐ ~y υA ◦ ϑB ◦ ηB (~w) ⊐ ~w
In summary, Alice’s and Bob’s tasks are thus to program strategies α = ϑA ◦ηA
and β = ϑB ◦ ηB with
υB ◦ α (~y) ⊐ ~y υA ◦ β (~w) ⊐ ~w
Alice’s universal strategy described in Sec. 3.5 is an instance of this α.
6 Concluding remarks
The starting point of this paper was the observation that finding and playing
one’s own strategy is often much easier than recognizing and understanding
other players’ strategies. In particular, randomizing is much easier than testing
randomness. On the other hand, knowing that the opponent keeps an eye on
how you play is necessary for the implementations of many equilibrium concepts,
usually assumed implicitly. In order to stay at an equilibrium, the players must
test each other. But capturing their tests opens an alley towards modeling
competition, outsmarting, and deceit, which are prominent in the practice of
gaming, but often ignored in game theory. We believe that the tools are readily
available to tackle this interesting and important aspect of gaming.
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Players’ randomness testing of each other’s plays turned out to be an in-
tuitive characterization of the notion of randomness. It is perhaps worth em-
phasizing here that the players with different computational powers recognize
different notions of randomness. More precisely, different families of program-
mable functions L induce different hypotheses, different tests, different notions
of randomness, and different implementations for the mixed strategy equilib-
ria. Restricting the family L to the language of regular expressions or finite
state machines would give a weak but interesting notion. The hypotheses could
be implemented along the lines of the familiar compression algorithms, such
as those due to Lempel, Ziv and Welch [38, 37]. However, since there is no
such thing as a universal finite state machine, capable of evaluating all finite
state machines, such tests based on regular languages would have to be spec-
ified one at a time, and sought ad hoc. In contrast, taking L to be a Turing
complete language, such as the language of Turing machines themselves, allows
constructing a universal randomness test, which Alice could implement as a
universal hypothesis from Sec. 3.4. This leads to the canonical notion of ran-
domness spelled out by Kolmogorov, Martin-Lo¨f and Solovay, and characterized
in Corollary 4.1. Although the simple dovetailing technique used to construct
the universal hypothesis quickly leads beyond the realm of what is considered
feasible computation, the methods of algorithmic learning and statistical induc-
tion are built upon them nevertheless [14, 28, 36].
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